JPRS 79384

5 November 1981

USSR Report

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

No. 18

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USSR-CEMA TRADE

INTEGRATION OF SOVIET ECONOMY WITH CEMA DISCUSSED

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[Article by B.A. Kheyfets: "Development of the Branch Structure of the USSR National Economy in the Situation of Socialist Economic Integration"]

[Text] This article discusses the most important trends and the degree to which integrating cooperation affects the development of the basic proportions in the USSR national economy. It describes current problems pertaining to the improvement of the branch structure and the make-up of export specialization of the Soviet economy in connection with stepping up its participation in the international socialist division of labor.

Improving the branch structure of the USSR national economy is an extremely important aspect of the strategic task of improving the economy's effectiveness. The CPSU Central Committee's draft "Main Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for the Years 1981-1985 and Extending to 1990" for the 26th party congress outline important steps to improve the branch structure.[1]

The conditions affecting the development and implementation of the policy for improving the branch structure have now changed substantially. One of the distinguishing features of the contemporary stage of the Soviet Union's economic development is the systematic activation of its participation in the international division of labor and socialist economic integration. These factors are having an increasing affect upon the national economic system.

Cooperation with the CEMA nations has a special role among the external structure-shaping factors, the intensification of which is producing a continuing build-up of economic interaction among the commonwealth states. In this situation, as the "Main Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for the Years 1981-1985 and Extending to 1990" stress, it is becoming more and more essential, while improving the most important national economic proportions, "to give all-round consideration... to expanding and intensifying production specialization."[2] The effect of socialist economic integration upon the development of the branch structure of the USSR economy is less powerful, of course, than in the other CEMA countries. This is due to the enormous scale of the Soviet economy, the extensive domestic market, the availability of various fuels and raw materials, a developed industrial and scientific research capability, and so forth, which, all else being equal, create good opportunities for the development of many branches of the national economy at the level of the contemporary technical and economic demands brought forth by the scientific and technological revolution. It is domestic demands which are the determining factors in the improvement of the USSR's national economic system.

In 1978 the USSR had around 71 percent of the population of the European CEMA countries and 70 percent of their total industrial output, while accounting for only 40 percent of the reciprocal trade.[3]

At the same time, there has been a significant increase in the structure-defining influence of foreign links, primarily reciprocal economic cooperation among the CEMA countries, a fact borne out by the outstripping average annual rates of growth of Soviet foreign trade, including trade with the CEMA countries, compared with the rates of growth of the national income and industrial output (table 1).

Table 1. Development of National Income and Industrial Output, 1961-1978

	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1975	1976-1978
National income	6.7	6.3	5.7	5.0
Industrial output	8.6	8.5	7.4	5.1
Foreign trade	7.4	8.5	18.1	11.5
Trade with CEMA nations	9.7	7.7	16.4	14.2

The data show that the degree of outstripping growth for reciprocal trade increased especially in the 1970s (even taking into account certain changes in foreign trade prices), when the Comprehensive Program of Socialist Economic Integration was begun.[4]

Activation of the USSR's participation in the international division of labor, primarily in the division of labor among the CEMA countries, is haveing an ever-increasing effect upon the development of individual structural subdivisions of the Soviet economy. Many fuel and raw material branches (petroleum, paper pulp, iron ore, cotton, the production of fiberboard, plywood, potassium fertilizers, and others) and branches producing durable consumer goods (timepieces, bicycles, mopeds, cameras, passenger cars and radios) export from 1/6 to 1/3 of all their output. Recent years have seen a marked increase in the portion of output designated for export also in such structural subdivisions as cardboard production (11% in 1978), television sets (9%), refrigerators (7%), tractors (9%) and certain other goods.

The increased influence of foreign economic links upon the branch structure of the USSR national economy is also reflected in the fact that imports are being used to an ever-increasing degree to meet certain demands of public production and of the population. For example, imports are accounting for an increased portion of the national economy's overall supply of electric trolleys, electric telphers, gantry cranes, buses, steel pipe, soda ash, leather footwear, regular cigarettes and Russian cigarettes (papirosy), sugar and so forth. The portion of imports has increased significantly in recent years for a number of these goods, which is due in great part to the development of cooperation among the CEMA nations. This is naturally relieving the pressure on the corresponding branches and industries of the Soviet national economy, permitting them to reduce the amount of funds allocated for their development or at least not to increase them as much.

The effect of socialist economic integration upon the development of the branch structure of the USSR national economy is felt most strongly at the intra-branch level. However, this influence is also felt at the level of large subdivisions of industry and individual groups of branches.

One of the macro-economic proportions in the industrial structure, the development of which cannot be fully understood without considering foreign economic links with the CEMA nations, is the coorelation between group "A" branches and those in group "B." For a long time the specific portion of group "A" branches in gross industrial output was greater for the USSR than for the other CEMA nations (table 2). Group "A" also constantly experienced outstripping rates of growth (almost equal rates of growth were experienced in the two branches, with production of the means of production still dominating, only between 1966 and 1970), whereas in other European CEMA countries during individual periods in their development rates of growth of the industrial branches producing consumer goods exceeded rates of growth for the branches producing the means of production. In Hungary group "B" has been developing at outstripping rates for almost 20 years now.

Table 2. Specific Portion of Group "A" Branches and Group "B" Branches in Gross Industrial Output (in percentages)*

Country	Group "A"			Group "B"		
	1960	1970	1978	1960	1970	1978
USSR	72.5	73.4	74.1	27.5	26.6	25.9
Bulgaria	42.2	54.7	60.7	52.8	45.3	39.3
Hungary	66.0	65.1	64.7	34.0	34.9	35.3
GDR	60.8	64.3	66.0	39.2	35.7	34.0
Poland	57.5	65.0	65.1	42.5	35.0	34.9
Romania	62.8	70.4	73.1	37.2	29.6	26.9
Czechslovakia	61.0	63.4	67.8	39.0	36.6	32.2

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*Compiled from "Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV"[Statistical Yearbook of the CEMA nations], Moscow, 1979, pp 74-75.

The bulk of industrial investments was designated for the development of group "A" branches, with an increase in the portion of capital invested in the production of the means of production. The portion was 84.9 percent between 1966 and 1970, increasing to 86.2 percent during the period 1971-1975 and to 87.6 percent in 1976-1978.[5]

The fact that a large specific portion and outstripping rates of growth were maintained for group "A" branches was due, in addition to other factors, to the development of foreign economic links, primarily links with the CEMA nations. The USSR is the commonwealth's largest importer of output from group "B" branches, imports of which have a significant role in the implementation of the reproduction process in its national economy, and exports the means of production on a significant scale.

Calculations show that means of production account for more than 90 percent of Soviet imports, and the figure is increasing, which corresponds to trends in changes occurring in the industrial structure. Means of production account for a smaller portion of imports, however--around 75-80 percent--and the portion of consumer goods is correspondingly higher.[6]

Soviet imports of manufactured consumer goods alone exceeded exports by 19.6 billion rubles between 1971 and 1978, and 3/4 of this negative balance was produced by trade with the CEMA nations.[7] The volume of foreign trade turnover, its structure and geographic distribution indicate that a stable division of labor has become established in this area among the commonwealth countries.

Typically, the portion of manufactured consumer goods in Soviet exports was the smallest among the European CEMA nations--3.1% in 1978--the corresponding figure being 20.0% for Hungary, which has the largest portion in the commonwealth, and ranging between 10% and 17% for the other European participants in the integration process. The portion of manufactured consumer goods in Soviet imports was 11.8% in 1978, the largest figure among the European CEMA countries, where the figure ranges between 4% and 7.5%.[8]

Shipments of goods from the partners in the integration process play an important role with respect to meeting the needs of the Soviet Union's population for many types of manufactured consumer goods and food items. For example, shipments by the CEMA countries account for at least 15% of the USSR's retail trade supply of such goods as clothing, footwear, knitwear, furniture and canned goods.[9]

Imports of consumer goods from the CEMA countries, which preliminary data indicate will increase to 40 billion rubles during the period 1981-1985, along with the outstripping rates of growth for group "B" branches planned for this period, will make it possible to accomplish more effectively the main task of the 11th Five-Year Plan--to further improve the people's welfare.

The Soviet Union is the largest exporter of fuel and raw materials among the CEMA nations and of products from those materials which have undergone initial processing, and this is naturally affecting the development of its extractive industry and branches producing semi-finished goods and raw materials.

Speaking of the influence of foreign economic links with the CEMA nations upon the branch structure of the Soviet economy in his speech at the 29th CEMA Session in 1975, A.N. Kosygin made the following statement: "The Soviet Union is not only providing an additional supply of important types of raw materials on a long-term basis but has also agreed to make certain changes in the structure of its national economy, increasing therein the specific portion of the raw-material branches in response to the needs of the socialist countries."[10]

A study of the correlation between the extractive and the processing industries shows that in the USSR at the end of the 1960s there was substantial growth in the specific portion of one of the most important fuel and raw-material branches--the ore extraction industry (table 3).

Table 3. Correlation Between Extractive and Processing Industries Within the Soviet Industrial Structure (gross output of all industry equals 100%*)

Branch of Industry	1965	1970	1975	1978
Processing	92.9	91.1	91.9	92.4
Extractive	7.1	8.9	8.1	7.6
Including ore extraction	4.4	6.1	5.7	5.3

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*Computed from "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1978"[The National Economy of the USSR in 1978], p 116.

Although the specific portion of the ore extraction industry began to drop slightly in the 1970s, it was above the 1965 level overall in 1978. In the other European CEMA countries, however, which receive the bulk of Soviet exports of fuel and raw materials, there has been a consistent drop in the specific portion of the extractive industry over the past 10 to 15 years.[11]

A large export sector has developed in many fuel and raw-material branches of the USSR, which is influencing the distribution of materials, financial and labor resources among the branches. A considerably greater portion of the total investments in industry has been channeled into the fuel and raw-material branches in the USSR than in the other CEMA nations.

A full 21.1% of all the capital invested in industry went into the fuel industry in the USSR in 1978, 8.2% in Bulgaria, 13.1% in Hungary, 12.1% in the GDR, 12.5% in Poland, 12.3% in Romania and 10.5% in Czechoslovakia. The portion of capital investments in the Soviet fuel industry increased during the 1970s, while the opposite trend occurred in all the European CEMA countries.[12] Specifically, more than 3/4 of the capital invested in the fuel industry in 1978 went into the oil and gas branches, which are active participants in the international socialist division of labor.[13] During the period 1971-1975, according to available estimates, the Soviet Union allocated around 7.6 billion rubles as capital investments to increase fuel exports to the CEMA nations. This was more than 8% of all the capital invested in the fuel industry, transport and communications. The amount of capital invested for this purpose reached 14 billion rubles during the period 1976-1980.[14]

It should be pointed out that various forms of cooperation among the CEMA nations are also contributing to the development of the fuel and raw-material branches in the USSR. Most of the long-term, special loans granted the USSR by the other CEMA countries, for example, were designated for increasing the production of specific types of fuel and raw materials and for their transportation. The other CEMA countries also sent to the Soviet Union groups of construction workers and specialists, mainly for the construction of industrial and transport facilities for increasing Soviet exports of fuel and raw materials.

The importance of integration cooperation to the development of the export sector in the Soviet fuel and raw-material branches is demonstrated by the fact that the implementation of joint projects by the CEMA nations in the USSR in 1976-1980 will make it possible to increase paper-pulp exports to the CEMA nations by approximately 40%, asbestos exports by 80% and exports of ferriferous raw materials and ferroalloys by 20%, compared with the 1975 level. When it reaches design capacity the Ust'-Ilimsk Paper and Pulp Combine, a large integration project, will produce up to 500,000 tons of bleached sulfate cellulose, which is approximately 9% of the 1978 production in the USSR.[15]

The specific orientation of the USSR's international specialization, along with the specific historical conditions surrounding its industrialization and subsequent stages in the structural development of its national economic system, are to a certain degree determining the contemporary development of proportions among the main branches of Soviet industry.

Two key groups of branches in scientific and technological progress--machine-building and the chemical industry--occupy a considerably less important place in the structure of Soviet industry, unlike the European CEMA countries. Their portion is constantly increasing, however (table 4). Back in 1950 the USSR surpassed all the European states in the commonwealth with respect to the specific portion of these branches (not including the GDR and Poland, for which data were not available). In subsequent years, however, as a result of industrialization and increased imports of fuel and raw materials from the USSR, the European CEMA countries were able to channel substantial resources into the development of higher levels of industrial processing. In 1960 the machine-building portion in the USSR was almost 2-fold greater than in Bulgaria, but the latter had surpassed it by 2.2 points in 1978. There is a somewhat smaller gap between the USSR and the European CEMA countries with respect to the portion of the chemical industry, for the development of which the USSR has a diverse raw-material foundation.

The USSR is the largest producer of agricultural raw materials among the CEMA countries, and the branches processing a considerable portion of these products--the food and gustatory and the textile industries--continue to account for a large portion in the structure of its industry. The specific portion of these branches is gradually dropping, however, a trend typical of economically developed countries, which also reflects to some degree the expansion of foreign economic links with the CEMA countries exporting various consumer goods and foodstuffs to the USSR.

Naturally, a comparison of branch structures of industrial production for gross output, like any other international comparison involving value indicators, contains a certain number of conditionalities, and differences in national price-setting methods affect the process considerably. We believe that this, among other things, accounts for the fact that in a number of CEMA countries the fuel industry represents a greater portion than in the USSR.

The effect of socialist economic integration upon the branch structure of the processing industry is manifested in various ways. On the one hand, the intensification of international socialist division of labor is strengthening the export base, which has a substantial effect upon the development of the corresponding branches and upon the servicing and auxiliary industries. This influence is multifaceted and it determines not only the quantitative parameters for production but also product quality, the progressiveness of the technological processes and so forth. On the other hand, the expansion of imports becomes an important factor in the changing structure of industry, making it possible not only to limit the development of the less effective branches but also to develop new structural subdivisions with significantly smaller outlays of means and time.

Imports of the tools of labor have the most revolutionizing effect with respect to structural advances. It frequently produces a so-called multiplying effect, because it affects not only the development of the corresponding branches of machine-building itself but also the performance of many other branches of the economy, especially in the case of tools of labor used to produce tools of labor.

The portion of imports of machine-building products in the USSR exceeds the figures for the other European CEMA countries, accounting for more than 40% of all imports (42% in 1978). And the specific portion of equipment for the rapidly developing

Table 4. Changing Specific Portion of the Most Important Branches in the Industrial Structure of the European CEMA Nations (total gross industrial output equals 100%)*

Branch of industry	USSR			Bulgaria			Hungary			GDR		Poland		Romania			Czechoslovakia		
	1950 г.	1970 г.	1978 г.	1960 г.	1970 г.	1978 г.	1950 г.	1970 г.	1978 г.	1970 г.	1978 г.	1970 г.	1978 г.	1950 г.	1970 г.	1978 г.	1960 г.	1970 г.	1978 г.
Производство электроэнергии и теплоэнергии (1)	2,1	2,9	3,0	1,7	2,6	2,5	4,2	5,1	5,6	5,5	5,7	2,5	2,3	2,0	3,2	1,8	2,2	2,8	3.3
Топливная (2)	9,1	6,8	6,2	3,8	4,7	3,5	11,7	8,6	7,8	6,4	5,9	7,8	5,7	12,1	5,1	4,4	9,6	7,4	7,4
Черная и цветная металлургия (3)	...	...	...	0,1**	3,2**	4,0**	10,3	11,5	9,9	7,7	7,8	11,4	10,0	8,2	11,8	11,2	10,5	11,6	11,3
Машиностроение и металлообработка (4)	20,7	23,2	26,0	9,1	20,1	28,2	20,6	28,9	30,8	30,5	32,7	25,6	33,9	12,9	25,1	33,2	14,2	29,8	29.2
Химическая и резиноасбестовая (5)	5,6	6,6	7,6	2,9	7,5	8,1	2,4	9,1	12,4	10,1	10,8	8,9	9,3	3,7	10,4	9,5	2,9	7,0	8,5
Лесная, деревообрабатывающая и целлюлозно-бумажная (6)	8,3	5,1	4,4	11,0	4,6	4,4	3,2	3,5	3,5	4,7	4,7	5,1	4,9	11,2	7,0	5,8	10,4	6,0	6,0
Текстильная и трикотажная (7)	10,0	10,0	10,2	14,2	9,2	7,5	11,1	5,4	4,5	6,2	5,6	8,1	7,1	11,9	7,2	8,3	8,8	5,3	5.1
Пищевкусовая (8)	22,7	20,9	18,8	41,0	25,4	21,7	23,9	16,3	14,5	18,3	16,7	17,9	15,4	25,1	17,3	13,8	29,2	15,9	14.4

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*Compiled from "Narodnoye khozyaystvo stran-chlenov SEV"[National Economy of the CEMA Nations], Moscow, 1979, pp 86-90; "Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV"[Statistical Yearbook of CEMA Nations], Moscow, 1979, pp 81-84.

**Ferrous metallurgy.

Key:

1. Production of electric and thermal energy
2. Fuel
3. Ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy
4. Machine-building and metal-working
5. Chemical and rubber-asbestos
6. Lumber, wood-working, paper-and-pulp
7. Textiles and knitwear
8. Food and gustatory

branches of industry is increasing among imports of machine-building products. The portion of equipment for the chemical industry increased from 5.8 to 12.0% between 1971 and 1978; petroleum processing equipment--from 0.6 to 2.1%; forging and molding equipment--from 1.4 to 1.5%; drilling machinery, equipment and rigs and equipment for operating wells and for geological prospecting--from 0.6 to 1.7%; and equipment for the textile industry--from 1.9 to 2.3%.[16]

For most items the CEMA countries account for the bulk of imports. Commonwealth nations accounted for 2/5 of all machinery and equipment imported by the USSR during the period 1971-1978. Imports from the CEMA countries are playing an important role in the renewal of the rolling stock for freight and passenger transport operations, in the mechanization of loading and unloading jobs and agricultural work and in the development of the telephone system and many branches of the chemical, light and food industries. The USSR is to receive more than 1,000 sets of equipment for various industrial enterprises from countries of the socialist commonwealth during the period 1976-1980.[17]

Imports of machinery and equipment from the CEMA countries will increase even more during the 1981-1985 period. According to preliminary data they will exceed 60 billion rubles. Deliveries of equipment for the secondary processing of petroleum, hoisting and transport equipment, forging and molding equipment, electronic computer equipment and so forth will account for an important part of this.

Imports of products meeting the modern requirements of technological progress, including the power-per-unit of machines, are becoming increasingly important. Quite recently, for example, Poland was delivering to the USSR equipment for sulphuric acid plants with a capacity of 100,000-180,000 tons of sulphuric acid per year, whereas it is now exporting complete enterprises with an annual capacity of 500,000 tons. One such plant would produce more than 2% of the total 1978 production of sulphuric acid.[18] This is added proof of the fact that specific deliveries of even individual sets of equipment and production lines can be an effective tool for perfecting the branch structure.

Stable, long-term delivers of specialized products are becoming an important structure-defining factor under integration. The development of international specialization is intensifying production concentration and preventing the unwarranted scattering of resources, which in the final analysis increases national economic effectiveness. The development of specialization by item and the establishment of cooperation in the production of a finished product based upon such specialization are becoming extremely important today. This kind of cooperation makes it possible to efficiently distribute production programs among individual countries and for each of them to enjoy a substantial total effect from the combining of material, financial and labor resources.

The USSR concluded 211 agreements on production specialization and cooperation with the CEMA nations at the beginning of 1978, including 88 multilateral agreements, most of which involve machine-building. The portion of goods delivered within the framework of such agreements in Soviet exports of machinery increased from 18.9 to 23.3% between 1973 and 1978. The specific portion of specialized products in exports of chemical products to the CEMA countries grew from 11.0 to 14.7% during the period 1974-1977.[19] During the 1978-1980 period the USSR concluded many new multilateral and bilateral agreements on production specialization and cooperation with the commonwealth countries.

The intensification of production specialization and cooperation with the CEMA nations is important to the development of many sub-branches of the Soviet processing industry, first and foremost, machine-building--the production of passenger cars and trucks, busses, machine tools, forging and molding machines, electronic computers, certain kinds of agricultural machinery, shuttleless looms, road construction machinery, excavators, loading machines and so forth. As of 1 January 1978, under multilateral agreements on production specialization and cooperation in machine-building concluded among the CEMA countries following the adoption of the Comprehensive Program, the USSR is to produce a total of almost 3,500 items (54% of all the specialized items covered by these agreements).[20]

The purposeful expansion of international production specialization and cooperation is creating the necessary preconditions for the extensive employment of the possibilities provided by socialist economic integration for perfecting the branch structure of the Soviet national economy.

The intensification of socialist economic integration is resulting in an intensification of mutual structural adaptation of the national economies of the USSR and the other CEMA nations. The development of this process is directly linked to the significant expansion of production specialization and cooperation planned by the commonwealth nations for the 1980s. A.N. Kosygin stated in his address at the 34th CEMA Session in 1980 that the "focus for the application of our joint efforts is the realization of our parties' coordinated course for making the forthcoming two five-year periods a time of intensive production, scientific and technological cooperation. The development of the processing industry, primarily machine-building, coordinated on this basis is opening up possibilities for substantially accelerating rates of scientific and technological progress."[21]

The CEMA nations have worked out and adopted five long-range, special cooperation programs (DTsPS), which are to be implemented over a period of 10 to 15 years, beginning in the current five-year period. These programs embrace a broad range of material production branches having to do directly or indirectly with the production of fuel and raw materials, food, consumer goods, modern machinery and equipment for the technical reequipping of machine-building and with the transport servicing of foreign economic links among the CEMA countries. Since the USSR is the commonwealth's largest producer of most types of products covered by the programs, implementation of the long-range programs will have a multifaceted effect upon the development of its branch structure.

The long-range programs are oriented toward the intensification of coordination in the development of the branches affected and toward the extensive application of various forms of economic cooperation. It is planned to work out 340 various undertakings within the framework of the programs, a significant portion of which will be agreements on production specialization and cooperation.[22] The realization of these agreements will result in further intensification of the mutual division of labor within the commonwealth. The development of machine-building will have an especially important role, and the fulfillment of all the long-range programs will depend greatly upon it. It is to a significant degree machine-building which is providing the necessary technical and economic preconditions for the effective accomplishment of joint tasks planned by the CEMA countries for the next 10-15 years.

Bilateral General Programs (schemes) for production specialization and cooperation between individual CEMA countries are also becoming enormously important to the development of the process of mutual interweaving and adaption of the branch structures of the national economies of the USSR and the other CEMA nations. Specifically, Secretary of the CPC Central Committee (Y. Kempnyy) pointed out the important role of the General Program of Production Specialization and Cooperation Between Czechoslovakia and the USSR with respect to making the 1981-1985 five-year period a period of specialization and cooperation with the USSR for the CSSR.[23]

At the end of 1979 and during the first half of 1980 the Soviet Union and each of the European CEMA countries signed six bilateral General Production Specialization and Cooperation Programs. These programs, the main burden of which also falls upon machine-building, will take into account the basic areas of production specialization specified in the long-range programs and will indicate new ways to intensify the division of labor among the CEMA countries over the long range--up to the years 1990-2000.

The long-range directions outlined for the development of mutual cooperation among the CEMA countries raises for the USSR the important task of further improving the branch structure of its national economic system and optimizing its specialization in the international socialist division of labor. One of the central problems is that of accelerating the development of machine-building and other branches of the processing industry by means of integration cooperation and of stepping up their participation in the international socialist division of labor.

At the present time machine-building products account for a small portion of Soviet exports, which is less than the specific portion of machine-building within the industrial structure. The correlation between the portion of machine-building in exports and its portion of industrial production was 0.8 in the USSR in 1978, 1.7 in Bulgaria and the GDR and 1.8 in Czechoslovakia.[24] The Soviet Union exports almost twice as much machinery as it imports. The ratio of exports to imports in 1978 had a coefficient of 0.5 for the USSR, 0.7 for Romania, 0.8 for Hungary, 1.0 for Poland, 1.1 for Bulgaria, 1.2 for Czechoslaovakia and 1.5 for the GDR.[25]

The Soviet Union has enormous potential and resources for the development of machine-building. The USSR has more than 2/3 of all workers employed in machine-building in the CEMA countries. In 1978 the Soviet Union produced 72% of the combined output of steel for the commonwealth countries, 76% of the cast iron and 69% of the rolled metal. The Soviet Union has a large network of planning and design and scientific research organizations, which support the development of many machine-building branches on a modern technological level.

Machine-building was the most dynamic branch of Soviet industry during the period 1965-1978. Its rapid development resulted from the need to accomplish the most important tasks involved in accelerating scientific and technological progress: increasing the power supply per production unit in labor and automating production; increasing the adoption of chemical methods in the national economy; mechanizing labor-consuming and heavy jobs; creating the conditions for adopting fundamentally new technological processes, and so forth. The 26th CPSU Congress noted the outstripping rates of growth in such machine-building branches as atomic power, metallurgy, chemical machine-building and certain sub-branches of the electrical engineering, radioelectronic and machine-tool industries and instrument-making, that is, the branches which create the foundation for large quantitative shifts in the development of all sectors of the national economy.[26]

The most important task in the 1980s will continue to be that of accelerating the development of machine-building. As L.I. Brezhnev stated in his speech at the October 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "during the next five-year period we need to devote special attention" to improving machine-building. "The tasks involved in renewing fixed capital and the technical reequipping of various areas of the national economy will essentially become increasingly acute for us."[27]

The fact that the requirements for Soviet participation in integration cooperation coincide with internal tasks involved in developing Soviet machine-building is creatting conditions conducive to the resolution of this problem. The continued development of foreign economic links, primarily integration links, will in turn bring out new tasks which must be taken into account for improving the branch structure of the Soviet national economy.

Experience in the economic development of the USSR and other nations with a powerful economic, scientific and technological capability has demonstrated the expediency of developing a broad range of modern branches and production operations in machine-building. At the same time the accelerated development of machine-building and activation of its participation in the integration process are making it essential to increase selectivity in the development of branches for international specialization. It was stated at the 33rd CEMA Session in 1979 that "we should concentrate our scientific and technological and machine-building capability in the main areas, there where it can give us the greatest practical return in the next five-year period, and apply the advantages of international specialization and cooperation."[28]

A selective approach to the development of the export sector in machine-building is also necessitated by the fact that in the situation today it is practically impossible for even a large country to achieve good technological and economic results from production in numerous branches at once, since only high-quality products meeting the demands put forth by technological progress today can become a stable item of export.[29] We also need to take into account the fact that the USSR already has certain achievements and other good preconditions in individual sub-branches of machine-building, which, all else being equal, provide advantages over other sub-branches (with respect to both outlays and time) for inclusion in the international socialist division of labor. Furthermore, a number of countries in the commonwealth have already developed specialization branches which cover a certain portion of the needs of the Soviet Union's national economy, and this makes it possible to limit the development of the corresponding structural subdivisions of the Soviet economy.

Determination of the main areas for international specialization and the concentration of material and labor resources therein do not, of course, have the objective of creating an overly narrow range of specialization for machine-building in the USSR, which for objective reasons must be considerably more extensive than for any other CEMA country. It is therefore urgent for us to determine those areas which will ensure the Soviet Union's effective participation in the international division of labor, primarily international socialist division of labor. The development of the appropriate areas of specialization in Soviet machine-building will help to perfect the branch's internal structure and to increase its portion in the overall industrial structure.

Among the promising areas for the development of Soviet machine-building, also involved in the intensification of socialist economic integration, we should mention first of all many sub-branches and production operations providing for the fulfillment of the long-range special programs of cooperation--nuclear-power machine-building, the production of mining equipment, equipment for the metallurgical, light and food industries, and so forth.

The production of equipment for nuclear power plants will essentially become a new sub-branch of Soviet machine-building, the largest specialized enterprise for which will be the Avtommash plant in Volgodonsk. The development of this sub-branch will take advantage of the broad possibilities provided by production specialization and cooperation among the CEMA nations. Under an agreement which has been concluded the USSR will produce the main items in nuclear-power machine-building--powerful, complete reactors, steam turbines and a large assortment of instruments and equipment; Czechoslovakia will produce reactor outfits, steam generators and the main circulation lines; Bulgaria--biological protection systems and fittings; Hungary--reactor servicing mechanisms; Poland--volume modifiers and diesel generators. Individual assemblies for the AES will be produced by the GDR and Romania, as well as Yugoslavia. Around 50 industrial enterprises of these countries will take part in the realization of this multilateral agreement, and the volume of reciprocal deliveries will amount to several billion transferable rubles.[30]

Modern machine-building production operations employing the latest achievements in science and technology, which are presently developing at accelerated rates, may also become promising areas for international specialization within the USSR's machine-building system. These include the production of equipment for new technological processes, systems of machinery, computer equipment, keyboards, laser equipment and so forth, for which the CEMA nations will have an increasing need.

Exports of complete sets of equipment continue to be important. In 1978 they accounted for 10-33% of the exports of machine-building products to the European CEMA nations and to Cuba, 54% of the exports to Vietnam and 82% of the exports to Mongolia.[31] Between 1976 and 1980 alone the USSR helped with the construction in the CEMA countries of around 1,000 important facilities for the metallurgical, petroleum refining and petrochemical, chemical, electric energy and construction industries.[32]

The expansion of exports of complete sets of equipment, which is a progressing trend in the world economy, is based upon the USSR's diverse industrial and scientific and technological capability. At the same time, it is possible to make broader use of cooperation with the commonwealth countries in the future development of this area of Soviet exports, which will make it possible not only to increase export volumes but also to take into fuller account the specific conditions in the importing countries.

Overall, exports of machinery and equipment will be one of the most dynamic areas of Soviet exports to the CEMA nations during the period 1981-1985. They will increase by 40% during that period over the 1976-1980 level, reaching 35 billion rubles.[33]

The development of other leading industrial branches--the chemical, paper and pulp, light and food industries--and activation of their participation in the international socialist division of labor is an important task involved in improving the structure of the Soviet national economy in connection with intensifying socialist economic integration. There are also broad possibilities in this area for economic, scientific and technological cooperation with the CEMA nations.

Exports of fuel and raw materials will naturally continue to be important in the future, although their possibilities are objectively limited. For this reason it will be important to develop branches whose output will "compensate" for the future inevitable relative reduction in the portion of fuel and raw materials in exports, which will require appropriate structural shifts in industry.[34]

Specifically, the realization of long-range special programs covering fuel and raw materials calls for expanding the exchange of products of the chemical industry. We refer to the creation in the USSR of capacities for the production of energy-intensive chemical products (ammmonia, methanol, polychloride, polyethylene and others) to be delivered to interested CEMA countries in exchange for agreed-upon quantities of less energy-intensive chemical products (dyes and semifinished products, crop protection chemicals, additives for polymers, plastics in small quantities, polyurethanes and their compounds, and others). This kind of specialization is due not only to a desire to increase exports obtained from the processing of petroleum, but also a desire to make more efficient use of the commonwealth's energy base. Cooperation in this field will contribute to the development of the Soviet chemical industry and to the improvement of its structure to increase the portion of the petrochemical subbranches.

The development of a number of "upper-level" production operations in the chemical industry to the level of an export sector may become more urgent in the future, including organic synthesis chemistry, small-scale chemistry, the pharmaceutical chemicals industry and so forth. The production of many products of these structural subdivisions could become an important area of specialization within the commonwealth by the Soviet national economic complex.

And so, the development of integration interrelations among the CEMA countries will result in an increase in the processing industry's portion; an increase within its structure of the specific portion of those branches which determine scientific and technological progress for the entire economy, primarily machine-building; and the formation of an export structure strictly specialized on a commonwealth scale. The development of branches of international specialization under the effect of socialist economic integration is creating the preconditions for achieving fuller satisfaction of internal needs as well and for participation in the worldwide division of labor.

Naturally, we cannot separate improvement of the branch structure of the Soviet national economy from the accomplishment of other urgent tasks involved in the development of the Soviet economy and integration cooperation with the CEMA nations. All of these tasks are closely interlinked, and only a comprehensive approach to their accomplishment will make it possible to consistently improve the effectiveness of the USSR's national economic complex.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 2 Dec 80.
2. Ibid.
3. Computed from "Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV"[Statistical Yearbook of the CEMA Nations], Moscow, 1979, pp 8-9, 67, 373; VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No. 5, 1978, p 127.

4. The so-called elasticity coefficients (the correlation between average annual rates of growth of exports and of the national income) for the USSR grew from 1.3 in 1961-1965 to 2.8 in 1976-1978. Among the CEMA nations only Hungary now exceeds the USSR with respect to this indicator, whereas in the 1960s it was below the vast majority of commonwealth countries.

5. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1978 g."[The National Economy of the USSR in 1978], Moscow, Statistika, 1979, pp 342-343.

6. "Faktory i tendentsii razvitiya struktury narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR"[Factors and Trends in the Structural Development of the USSR's National Economy], Moscow, Nauka, 1977, p 323.

7. Soviet foreign trade statistics for the corresponding years.

8. "Statisticheskiy..." op. cit., pp 375-380.

9. PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO, No. 1, 1979, p 11.

10. PRAVDA, 25 Jun 75.

11. During the period 1965-1978, for example, the extractive industry's specific portion dropped from 5.6 to 2.9% in Bulgaria, 6.4 to 3.8% in Hungary, 7.1 to 4.6% in Poland and 4.9 to 4.3% in Czechoslovakia. Although the data cited, which were taken from the corresponding national statistical yearbooks, are not comparable due to certain differences in the methods used for figuring the extractive industry's output, in the level and structure of the prices used for computation, and so forth, they adequately reflect a trend also typical of many developed capitalist states.

12. "Statisticheskiy..." op. cit., p 179.

13. "Narodnoye..." op. cit., p 344.

14. VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No. 12, 1979, p 98; "Statisticheskiy..." op. cit., 1974, pp 148, 153; 1977, p 147; 1978, pp 141, 145, 147.

15. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, No 11, pp 13, 16; "Statisticheskiy..." op. cit., 1979, p [page number missing].

16. Statistics on Soviet foreign trade for the corresponding years.

17. PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO, No. 1, 1979, p 11.

18. VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, No. 11, 1978, p 9; "Statisticheskiy..." op. cit., 1979, p 111.

19. PRAVDA, 16 Apr 79; EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV, No. 3, 1979, p 83; No. 1, 1980, p 62.

20. EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV, No. 3, 1978, pp 15, 19.

21. Ibid., No. 4, 1980, p 31.

22. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA, No. 27, 1980, p 20.

23. Ibid., No. 47, 1978, p 20.

24. Computed from "Statisticheskiy..." op. cit., 1979, pp 82, 375-377.

25. Ibid., pp 371, 375-380.

26. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS"[25th CPSU Congress Materials], Moscow, 1976, pp 137, 138, 183, 184.

27. PRAVDA, 22 Oct 80. During the period 1981-1985 machine-building output is to grow at least 1.4-fold, whereas industrial output in general is to increase by 26-28%.

28. EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV, No. 4, 1979, p 71.

29. The performance of VAZ[Volga Motor Vehicle Plant] has demonstrated the effectiveness of concentrating efforts on the creation of large, technically modern production operations involved in the international division of labor. The construction of this plant, the nation's largest, and its output of products measuring up to world standards have made it possible significantly to increase shipments of vehicles to foreign markets. Overall, Soviet exports of passenger cars (including unassembled cars) grew from 91,800 in 1970 to 403,000 in 1978.

30. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA, No. 13, 1979, p 19; No. 27, 1980, p 20.

31. "Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1978 g."[Soviet Foreign Trade in 1978], Moscow, 1979, pp 45-47.

32. EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV, No. 2, 1979, p 104.

33. Ibid., No. 4, 1980, p 30.

34. During the period 1981-1985, for example, total shipments of fuel and energy from the USSR to the other CEMA countries will exceed the figure for the previous five-year period by 20%, whereas the corresponding increase was around 50% for 1976-1980 and 76% for the period 1971-1975 (EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV, No. 4, 1979, p 44; "Sovremennyye tendentsii vneshney torgovli evropeyskikh sotsialisticheskikh stran"[Contemporary Trends in the Foreign Trade of the European Socialist Nations], Moscow, Supplement No. 5 to BIKI[Bulletin of Foreign Commercial Information], 1979, pp 19-20).

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11499
CSO: 1825/48

TRADE WITH INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

SOVIET UNION, AUSTRIA MAINTAIN GOOD TRADE LINKS

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Sep 81 p 6

[Article by I. Mel'nikov and A. Murzin, Vienna-Moscow: "The Fruits of a Partnership"]

> [Text] For more than just a single decade the VOEST-Alpine combine spread over the gently sloping bank of the Danube has used the river as its "highroad" to the east, to its Soviet partners. Sheet metal for the manufacture of motor vehicles, gas pipe, river vessels, steel for plow shares and various types of wire leave from there for the USSR. The barges do not return empty. Our nation delivers various types of industrial goods to VOEST-Alpine.

Engineer S. Bauer spent a long time showing us around the various enterprises at the combine. In the cold rolling shop the powerful mill easily turned out the thinnest of sheet metal for motor vehicles, as though it were paper. The company delivers 300,000 tons of this sheet metal to our motor vehicle plants, plus another 200,000 tons for pipe production. When R. Kirchwerger, R. Mitter, W. Plattner and other leaders at the combine told about their links with our country they invariably commented that the 25-year history of these links has demonstrated mutual benefit and stability. They named the participation of VOEST-Alpine in the construction of a steel foundry in Lipetsk as one of the prominent landmarks.

This leading concern of the alpine republic is vitally interested in further expanding and intensifying these ties, however. This spring a sizeable contract was concluded for the delivery of seamless pipe to the Soviet Union. The concern has already made the necessary investment in one of its plants in the Styrian town of Kindberg, which will ship 800,000 tons of pipe to the USSR within the next few years.

The residents of Sankt Polten could no doubt also say that their well-being depends to a considerable degree upon the state of affairs at the local Voight company. Chairman of the board V. Silbermeyer convincingly explained the company's interest in trade with the Soviet Union: They do not have a larger or more consistent client. Over the past 20 years the USSR has purchased a quarter of this company's output.

The Voight company produces papermaking machines. It recently received an order to manufacture an assembly for the Syktyvkar Lumber Complex. The machine will have a capacity of 180,000 tons of printer's paper annually. And it will be built through a cooperative effort with Soviet enterprises. The company also produces hydraulic turbines, machine tools and a great deal more. In one of the shops we were shown an automatic match-making machine. A total of 75 have already been delivered to our country. Equipment for the production of asbestos-cement items produced by the company is operating at a number of Soviet plants. Voight, in turn, buys our machine tools. It gives them an excellent rating.

Since the State Agreement was concluded, we were told by our hospitable hosts from Austria's Federal Chamber of Trade and Industry, trade and economic cooperation between our countries has developed productively. Extremely diverse and solid links have been established during the quarter of a century. Life moves forward, however, and demands the intensification and expansion of these links.

Officials in the chamber are especially concerned that small but viable companies not be left "floating" in a sea of endless, confusing crises. Their opinion is shared by federal Minister of Trade, Commerce and Industry J. Staribacher:

"We have great regard for the work performed by the joint Austrian-Soviet Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Our mutually advantageous partnership enables us to build up the rates and the extent of our economic links and to seek new ways and forms of interaction. And these exist, if only we take into fuller account the nature and the interests not only of our large companies, but those of the medium-size and small ones as well."

I should explain that the ever-increasing interest of Soviet foreign trade organizations in these "modest partners" is easy to justify. In Austria there are hundreds of companies which are simply not able to take on the building of a KamAZ or a giant gas pipeline, let us say, but which are capable of producing small series of products at the modern technological level: the most modern units, assemblies and production lines for the most diverse industrial and agricultural production operations. In this sense, figuratively speaking, Austria's economy is oriented toward the services sphere and enjoys a good reputation in the world.

The rigid laws of competition on the capitalist markets force the companies to remain constantly at the cutting edge of technological progress, to spend large sums on research and to react flexibly to the customers' damands. In addition, as A. Anger, a manager from Linz, commented in our discussion, it takes years for an industrial giant to set up or replace this or that production process, while a small company will immediately turn a new idea into a finished product. The items and the technology are "strictly to order" or, as the Austrians say, "made to measure" and take into account all the customers' wishes. This is the basic orientation of the extraordinarily versatile Austrian companies.

The Austrian economy has to deal with these and other problems. The most pressing problem is the great strain on the balance of trade caused primarily by Austria's inequality in its trade with the Common Market. This is sufficiently well demonstrated by the fact that almost a quarter of the FRG's currency intake comes from little Austria, which buys almost as many West German goods as does the USA. And is it not the EEC countries which load the republic with goods accounting for three quarters of its almost 90-billion foreign trade deficit?

The nation's business circles follow with unconcealed alarm the egotistical inflation of the rate of exchange for the dollar by the United States. This process crudely forced upon Western Europe by the American monopolies also hurts Austria considerably, since most of its foreign trade operations are carried out in dollars. According to the Institute of Economic Studies in Vienna Austria's foreign trade losses from this "trip-up" have amounted to around 11 billion schillings since the beginning of the year. And the nation's trade deficit continues to grow unrestrained.

Is there any point in mentioning, in view of these facts, the hypocrasy of the sighs uttered in certain local newspapers when imports from the Soviet Union exceed Austrian exports in any amount, sighs clearly inspired by the Western monopolies? They ordinarily use a single, solitary "basic" fact as "proof": The last Soviet deficit in its trade with Austria occurred in 1975, after which the balance shifted in our favor. The critics and complainers, however, "do not mention" the fact that the structure of the transactions between the partners has remained mutually advantageous and based on equality or that the changes occurring in the balance are due primarily to increases in the price of energy raw materials on the world market. Furthermore, the structure of Soviet exports makes it possible to create jobs at Austrian enterprises, whereas the flow of Western goods results in a drop in employment in the nation.

The figures are in fact the best proof of the mutual advantage of trade between our countries. Last year commodity turnover between the USSR and Austria reached 1 billion rubles, compared with 445,000,000 rubles in 1975, more than doubling during the five-year period. And the process was reciprocal: Our exports grew, and shipments of Austrian goods to the USSR also increased.

Qualitative improvement is increasingly in evidence, along with the quantitative increase in cooperation. As just one typical example of this, PRAVDA has already written about the solid links between the (Hayd) company and Soviet enterprises and organizations. These links are now being increased even more. Last year, for example, the machine-tool builders in Ryazan' and those at the Hayd plant in the town of Stokerau on the Danube had their first successful experiment in industrial cooperation, producing a complex machine tool through a joint effort. Specialists in both countries are studying the possibility of applying this experience in other areas of production. The process is being furthered, among other things, by setting up industrial trade exhibits. The largest Austrian exhibit will soon be set up in Moscow.

"This is an important undertaking for us," said G. Heller, director of the Institute for Assistance to the Economy. "It will be not simply an exhibit but an Austrian scientific and technological week in the new International Trade Center in Moscow. Sixty of our companies will take part in the exhibit, and 50 of them will display their goods. More than 100 reports will be presented at a symposium. I am confident that the exhibit will create great interest in the Soviet specialists."

There is a solid basis for this confidence. It is founded not just on past experience but on future prospects as well. There are many examples to support it. Take just the following, for example: Using thoroughly rusted, old rails specially selected for the purpose, specialists from the Plasser und Teurer company in Linz showed us a machine for grinding such rails in operation, as well as other equipment. Each year this company produces 250 various machines for laying rails and for maintaining them in operating condition. It has various types of long-standing, growing links with our Ministry of Railways and Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building. They include an exchange of licenses, the purchasing of finished equipment and the joint development of machinery. This is how the latest unit for welding rails came into being, as an example. More than a single year now these highly productive machines have operated in Italy, Greece, Norway, Holland, Brazil and other countries. The USSR provides the company with the main operating assembly--the welding machine. One of the enterprise directors, V. Eilerer, commented that the new machine has a good future.

When they explained their attitude toward increasing links between the USSR and Austria the managers invariably stressed the fact that they are doing that which others cannot, and sometimes, should not do. Why should a large or a small nation spend funds on research and the production of items whose production has already been set up and which incorporates the latest scientific and technological achievements?

We saw graphic proof of this fact at the (Andritz) company in Graz, the Anger company in Linz and many other companies. Take, as an example, Anger, a small but well-known plant which produces rims for glasses. Rims for glasses might seem like an insignificant thing. Each of the 56 operations involved in their production is performed by a special, separate machine tool, however. And they have earned a good reputation: Anger produces 1,200 rims per day and sells its products to 50 countries.

How many of these plants would we have to buy to satisfy the demand of our enormous country, however? We found a solution, though. A plant has been purchased, one which will produce 24,000 rims per day in Yelets. The technology is being provided by the Anger company, while the giant VOEST-Alpine will manufacture the equipment.

"As you can see, there are no unsolvable problems when there is a will and mutual benefit," Anton Anger, head of the company, said with a smile when he ended his talk on the plant. "Naturally, we could have found a powerful partner in the FRG for this deal, but we chose VOEST-Alpine. We are Austrians, after all, and we must help Austria."

Help Austria.... Yes, the neutral republic wants to function in peace, without any "tugging at the shirttails," without being dictated to and screamed at from abroad. We saw additional proof of this as we completed our travels about the alpine nation.

11499
CSO: 1825/44

SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER INTERVIEWED

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 9, Sep 81 pp 6-9

[Interview with Nikolai Patolichev, minister of foreign trade, date not given]

[Text]

Could you describe the overall results of the Soviet Union's foreign trade in the past five-year period?

N. Patolichev: **Everything we are doing in the sphere of international economic relations is focussed on one indicator—our foreign trade turnover. In the past five years its volume rose by more then 85 per cent compared with 1975 and in 1980 exceeded 94,000 million rubles. Is this much or little? In absolute figures, the increment was almost double the country's entire foreign trade turnover in, say, 1970. During the tenth five-year period we doubled our imports as against 1971-75. Exports rose by about the same margin.**

The national economy received additional material resources from the external market. This conduced to its accelerated development and to fuller satisfaction of consumer demand. With the use, to one or another degree, of imported technology, new major production capacities were created in the past five years. About 1,200 complete sets of imported equipment and a number of large enterprises were commissioned, such as the Kama lorry factory, the Atommash plant and numerous chemical plants. Foreign trade helped considerably in the construction of gas and oil pipelines and the Baikal-Amur Railway, the enlargement of the merchant and fishing fleet, and the strengthening of the technical base of agriculture.

In the five years we imported 66,000 million rubles' worth of machines, plant and vehicles, about two-thirds from socialist countries. In the ninth five-year period the figure was 29,000 million rubles.

Foreign trade contributed more than ever before to the fulfilment of the main task to which the development of the whole national economy is geared—raising the material and cultural standards of life of the Soviet people. Compared with the ninth five-year period, we imported nearly twice as much consumer manufactures and foodstuffs, and raw materials for their production. Approxima-

tely as much was spent on this as on the import of machines and plant.

Apart from the purely material effect, the extension of our business contacts with foreign countries—and this is very important—made for the successful pursuit of the Soviet foreign policy of preserving peace and strengthening detente and mutual understanding among nations.

What are the principal tasks of Soviet foreign trade in the light of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress?

N. Patolichev: **It was stated clearly at the congress that our policy of extensive development of international economic cooperation would remain unchanged both for next five years and for the 1980s in general. We shall continue to make active use of our foreign contacts to speed scientific and technological progress and heighten the well-being of the Soviet people. We will be guided by the task the Congress set for the entire national economy: « The economy must be economical. » In practice this means striving for maximum benefit for our country. There should be strict economy of export resources, especially the more valuable types of fuel and raw materials. And we should purchase only goods which we need most—items which it is more economically expedient to purchase abroad than to produce at home, or those which we are unable as yet to produce in sufficient quantities.**

Today the Soviet Union is trading with 139 countries. In conformity with the congress decisions, we shall strengthen and expand our economic cooperation with all countries that evince an interest in this.

As before, the socialist countries occupy the principal place in our country's external economic relations. What are the prospects in this sphere, and what new joint projects could be mentioned?

N. Patolichev: **The socialist countries account for more than half of our foreign trade, with the bulk of it—about nine-tenths—falling to the share of the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In 1980 our trade with the socialist countries amounted to 50,600 million rubles. In the next five years we expect it to increase by at least 40 per cent.**

All-round development of socialist economic integration remains the central trend within the CMEA. The main thing here is to fulfil long-term cooperation programmes oriented on the solution of the paramount problems of the energy, fuel and raw material and engineering sectors, agriculture, transport, and consumer goods production. Many of the aims outlined in these programmes have already been embodied in concrete agreements. We are

actively carrying them out on both multilateral and bilateral basis.

One of the most important tasks in cooperation with the fraternal countries in the 1980s is further development of specialization and cooperation in production. Good groundwork for this has already been laid. I have in mind the large number of agreements in different branches of the economy. A powerful impetus to this cooperation is the realization of bilateral long-term programmes of specialization and cooperation in production. In 1980 we concluded such agreements with Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. All these agreements are tied up closely with the long-term target oriented cooperation programmes. And on a broader plane, the task here is to facilitate to the maximum the achievement of the long-term aims of socialist and communist construction.

Take, for instance, the fuel and energy programme. It is pivoted on large-scale nuclear power development, which is to become the principal source of the growth of generating capacities in the USSR and other socialist countries. In the 1980s, the fraternal countries will be jointly building atomic power stations with an aggregate capacity of about 37 million kW. These will include the 4-million-kW Khmelnitsky atomic power station in the USSR. Incidentally, the realization of such an ambitious programme called for the establishment, on the basis of cooperation, of an entire international branch of industry —atomic engineering. It unites some 50 enterprises in eight countries, the principal being our Atommash plant. European socialist countries have concluded an agreement on multilateral specialization and cooperation in the manufacture of equipment for atomic power stations till 1990. This is the first agreement on such a scale in world practice.

Other important projects are contemplated, specifically those in the spheres of production of iron-containing raw materials, ferro-alloys, and some engineering items. At present the CMEA countries are working on their second coordinated plan for multilateral integration measures in 1981-85. All the concrete cooperation projects will figure in it.

Now, if you don't mind, we shall turn to the industrially developed capitalist countries. How, in general outline, is trade with them developing?

N. Patolichev. Our business relations with this group of countries have by now reached a fairly high level, which in many respects was due to the successes of detente achieved in the 1970s. Our business contacts with these countries rest on a solid contractual basis, they are stable and tend to expand. The favourable changes in the international political climate and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 brought about an increase in trade between the USSR and the capitalist countries. It rose from 4,700 million rubles in 1970 to more than 30,000 million in 1980, a 570 per cent increase. Alongside « pure » trade, cooperation on a compensation basis is growing. I refer to the joint construction on Soviet territory of large projects whose produce will be used as payment.

How did the other capitalist countries react to Washington's attempts to organize trade boycott of the USSR?

N. Patolichev. Our press has already given an assessment of the discriminatory measures of the US Administration aimed at curtailing trade with the USSR. Not content with unilateral measures, the American Administration pressured the other capitalist countries to follow suit and introduce economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. The facts show, however, that our West European partners refused to follow in the United States' wake. West European business circles have been advancing their own proposals for extending economic cooperation with the USSR.

As for the USA, in 1980 trade with that country declined by almost 50 per cent. Incidentally, such a drop is not new. US reactionary circles have more than once tried to use trade to bring political pressure to bear on our country. Failing to achieve their object, they resorted to curtailing bilateral trade ties in the hope of doing us economic damage. Such attempts were made in the 1930s and 1950s, always without success. They failed this time too. The embargo on the sale of grain to the USSR fell short of its aim: the USSR bought the required amount of grain from other countries, and the American farmers were the only losers. It is our deep conviction that trade helps to strengthen good relations between peoples. We stand for complete normalization of trade and economic relations with the USA, for their development on the basis of mutual benefit and equality. As you know, Washington has now lifted the embargo ordered by Carter on the delivery of grain and some other goods to the USSR.

Britain seemed at first to be ready to support the US trade policy. But then it was noted in London that sanctions against the Soviet Union do not work. A large contract with the Imperial Chemical Industries was signed. Moscow was visited by a delegation of British businessmen. Have there been any new developments here?

N. Patolichev: **The contract with the ICI, concluded in London in November 1980 for a term of ten years, envisages mutual deliveries of chemical goods.**

In January a delegation of British businessmen visited Moscow. They participated in a meeting of representatives of the foreign trade ministries of the USSR and Britain to verify the fulfilment of the Long-Term Programme for the Development of Economic and Industrial Cooperation signed by the two countries in 1975. The meeting adopted a protocol outlining ways of extending mutually advantageous cooperation.

How do we stand with France? Could you cite an instance characterizing the development of new forms of Soviet-French business contacts?

N. Patolichev: **In the five years between 1975 and 1979 our trade with France trebled. This was envisaged in the accords reached during Soviet-French summit meetings. The Agreement on Economic Cooperation for 1980-1985 and the Long-Term Programme for the Expansion of Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation for 1980-1990 are being successfully carried out. As a result, in 1980 the volume of trade between the two countries rose by 43 per cent, reaching 3,800 million rubles.**

The relations of Soviet foreign trade organizations with Rhône-Poulenc can serve as an example of creative approach to the search for new forms of mutually advantageous Soviet-French cooperation. In 1976 a General Agreement on Cooperation in the Chemical Industry was signed with that firm. As distinct from ordinary compensation agreements, it covers numerous chemical product lines and a wider range of goods delivered. The part of the agreement that concerns the purchase of equipment in France has been practically fulfilled. Soviet organizations have bought equipment for the production of compound fertilizers, chemical pesticides and other items. Since the agreement proved very fruitful, considerably benefiting both sides, the USSR signed a new General Agreement with this firm in December 1980, during the 15th session of the Commission. It envisages the construction in the Soviet Union of facilities for the production of fertilizers and insecticides, the delivery by Rhône-Poulenc of a number of chemical products to the USSR and Soviet deliveries of certain chemical products and oil derivatives to France. Thus, our cooperation with Rhône-Poulenc is expanding.

The Federal Republic of Germany has for a number of years been our biggest Western trading partner

N. Patolichev. **That's right. In the past ten years our** trade with the FRG has grown more than ten-fold, reaching an impressive 5,800 million rubles in 1980. Equally important is the fact that our economic relations have changed qualitatively as well. Noteworthy in this respect are large-scale projects, such as, for instance, the purchase of West German equipment for the Atommash plant, the Oskol electrometallurgical combine, and chemical enterprises, and of pipes and equipment for gas pipelines. We are now holding talks with West German firms on cooperation in the construction of large projects in the gas, coal, oil, chemical and several other industries.

Finland is a small country. But thanks to goodneighbourly relations it occupies a prominent place in the Soviet Union's foreign trade. The same is true of neutral Austria.

N. Patolichev: Economic relations between the Soviet Union and Finland are distinguished by stability, scope and diversity of forms. In the past five years our trade with Finland exceeded the 1971-1975 level by almost 150 per cent. A trade agreement for 1981-1985 has been concluded. As for the prospects for economic relations with Finland, they are determined by the Long-Term Programme for the Development and Deepening of Trade, Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, to effective till the end of 1995.

In the 1980s, as has already become traditional, shall continue to build joint projects and promote cooperation in production. We shall complete the construction of the Kostomuksha mining and ore-dressing combine, the Svetogorsk pulp and paper mill, several hotels and other projects. We are also studying the possibility of joint designing and building equipment for prospecting for and recovering the resources of the continental shelf and the construction of nuclear ice-breakers and 1,000-megawatt atomic power stations. We also intend to broaden long-term cooperation in the production and delivery of foodstuffs.

As you can see, our relations with Finland are an excellent example of mutually advantageous and equal cooperation of countries with different social systems.

As for Austria, our trade with that country is nearing one billion rubles. In January our countries signed a Long-Term Programme for the Expansion of Economic, Scientific, Technical and Industrial Cooperation for 1981-1990. Provision is made, in particular, for the expansion of trade, extension of cooperation in production and for the designing and construction of various projects in the USSR and Austria. During Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Tikhonov's recent visit to Austria the two sides declared in favour of continuing to increase the intensity and volume of economic ties, to heighten their effectiveness and to search for new ways and forms of cooperation.

In March the twelfth session of the Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation between the USSR and Italy was held in Rome. What are its results?

N. Patolichev: It was decided to speed up the drafting of the Long-Term Programme of Cooperation up to 1990 taking into account the new trends and possibilities. The commission examined also the prospects for some new large-scale joint projects. Mention may be made of the participation of Italian firms in the construction of a gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe, the participation of FIAT in putting out a new model at the Volga car factory, and cooperation with Montedison in chemistry. On the whole, our trade with Italy exceeded 3 billion rubles in 1980 and tends to grow further. So we are satisfied with our trade with Italy.

What is your opinion of our trade with Japan? Business circles in that country are evidently interested in its further development, but the Suzuki government's position is rather ambiguous.

N. Patolichev: Soviet-Japanese trade and economic ties in the past five years were on the whole successful. The volume of mutual goods deliveries roughly doubled as compared with the previous five-year period. The compensation agreements on the prospecting for and development of the forest wealth, coal, oil and gas of Siberia and the Far East were being carried out. Contacts in the credit and financial sphere were being extended. They enabled Japan to increase considerably the export of complete sets of equipment and large-diameter pipes to the Soviet Union. Negotiations were held with Japanese firms on new large-scale contracts.

However, to the detriment of its own business circles, the Japanese government followed the US policy of raising artificial obstacles to trade with the Soviet Union. As a result there was a sharp decline in 1980, and Japan, which used to be the Soviet Union's second biggest partner in the capitalist world, dropped to fifth place.

The most important factor which continued to retard the development of trade and economic ties is the absence of a stable long-term basis similar to that on which our relations with the leading West European countries rest. I mean economic, scientific, technical and industrial cooperation agreements and long-term programmes concluded on their basis. Such agreements and programmes offer a prospect for 10-15 and more years ahead.

India is the Soviet Union's biggest trading partner among the developing countries.

N. Patolichev: Since the mid-fifties, when regular trade and economic contacts between the Soviet Union and India were established, our trade with India has grown more than 150 times over. In 1980 it reached the record figure of 1,700 million rubles. This is 68 per cent more than in 1979 and more than double the volume of Soviet-Indian trade in the mid-seventies. Thus, the USSR and India have fully carried out the task, set in their point declaration of November 29, 1973, of increasing by 1980 their mutual trade by 50-100 per cent.

Our trade with India is based on five-year agreements, with settlements made in Indian rupees, without the use of freely convertible currency.

The Soviet Union has been constantly rendering economic and technical assistance to India in building an independent national in different branches of industry have large enterprises in different branches of industry have been built there.

A fresh impulse to the strengthening of Soviet-Indian relations was given by Leonid Brezhnev's visit to India last December. The Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation and the Trade Agreement for 1981-1985 signed during the visit laid the groundwork for the further extension of our mutually beneficial ties.

Big changes are under way in Africa. Is it possible, in this connection, to speak of a certain enlivening of our trade and economic contacts with that continent?

N. Patolichev: Yes, indeed. These contacts are developing quite dynamically and becoming ever more stable. At present, proceeding from the possibilities and requirements of the sides, we trade with 47 of the 51 independent African states, and in the case of 38 of them trade is carried out on the basis of intergovernmental agreements. The volume of Soviet-African trade is growing. In 1980, it amounted to 2,000 million rubles in volume, as against 1,400 million rubles in 1975, i.e., an almost 43 per non-ferrous metals, bauxites, oil, highly-effective phospho- favourably with Angola, Algeria, Libya, Morocco,Mozambique, Nigeria, and Ethiopia.

Many African countries use our planes, helicopters, lorries and cars, tractors, combine harvesters and other farm machinery. We deliver complete sets of equipment for industrial enterprises. Such deliveries help young states to develop the key branches of the national economy, in particular power production, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, oil and oil-refining industry, machine building, agriculture and transport.

In turn, the Soviet Union purchases in Africa goods needed by our national economy, including ferrous and non-ferrous metals, bauxites, oil, highly-effective phosphorous fertilizers, tropical timber for the furniture industry, cork, citrus fruit, cocoa beans, fruit juices, grape wines,

olives and some other products of agriculture and the manufacturing industry.

In the past years there has been a noticeable increase in the Soviet Union's trade and economic co-operation with Latin America.

N. Patolichev: **The enlivening of our trade and economic relations with Latin America has been furthered by detente. In 1970 the Soviet Union traded with 14 Latin American countries, and the total trade turnover was a mere 80 million rubles. In 1980 the corresponding figures were 27 and nearly 1,700 million. Latin American countries export products in which we are interested, among them those which we cannot produce by virtue of the climatic conditions, while they, in turn, purchase increasing quantities of Soviet machinery and plant. Large electric power stations are being built with Soviet assistance in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. « We are pleased to note the expansion of the Soviet Union's mutually beneficial ties with Latin American countries and are prepared to continue expanding them, » Leonid Brezhnev said in the Central Committee's report to the 26th CPSU Congress. I believe that a more active search for possibilities of organizing cooperation on a long-term, stable basis would be useful in this respect.**

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English translation "Foreign Trade", 1981

CSO: 1812/4

SOVIET TRADE DATA FOR JANUARY-JUNE 1981

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 9, Sep 81 insert

[Text]

(Statistical Data)

Soviet Foreign Trade by Groups of Countries

(mln rubles)

		January — June				January — June	
		1980	1981			1980	1981
TOTAL	Turnover	45952,3	54354,2	Industrial	Turnover	14679,7	17278,9
	Export	23104,8	26526,5	capitalist	Export	6823,2	7334,2
	Import	22847,5	27827,7	countries	Import	7856,5	9944,7
Socialist	Turnover	25452,9	29201,0				
countries	Export	13058,1	15367,3				
	Import	12394,8	13833,7				
including:							
CMEA	Turnover	23395,6	26306,1	Developing	Turnover	5819,7	7874,3
member	Export	11860,6	13965,7	countries	Export	3223,5	3825,0
countries	Import	11535,0	12340,4		Import	2596,2	4049,3

Soviet Foreign Trade by Countries*

(mln rubles)

Countries		January — June	
		1980	1981
Europe:			
Austria	Turnover	439,7	650,2
	Export	279,9	392,0
	Import	I59,8	258,2
Belgium	Turnover	577,4	5I7,I
	Export	40I,5	249,I
	Import	I75,9	268,0
Bulgaria	Turnover	3604,8	4089,2
	Export	I804,I	2209,4
	Import	I800,7	I879,8
Great Britain	Turnover	836,3	979,4
	Export	320,5	348,8
	Import	5I5,8	630,6
Hungary	Turnover	2809,8	326I,8
	Export	I448,2	I646,7
	Import	I36I,6	I6I5,I
German Democratic Republic	Turnover	4440,3	5209,I
	Export	2340,3	264I,I
	Import	2I00,0	2568,0
Greece	Turnover	23I,7	420,5
	Export	I87,4	349,5
	Import	44,3	7I,0
Denmark	Turnover	I60,9	225,2
	Export	I22,3	74,3
	Import	38,6	I50,9
West Berlin	Turnover	III,7	II8,I
	Export	7I,8	78,0
	Import	39,9	40,I

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* The countries are given in the Russian alphabetical order.

Supplement to the *Foreign Trade* journal. Editorial office address: 4, Pudovkin Street, 119285 Moscow, USSR. Telephone: 143-14-58.

Countries		January — June	
		1980	1981
Ireland	Turnover	50,4	25,3
	Export	8,6	9,8
	Import	4I,8	I5,5
Iceland	Turnover	53,2	63,8
	Export	36,I	29,2
	Import	I7,I	34,6
Spain	Turnover	I72,3	479,I
	Export	I03,7	I56,I
	Import	68,6	323,0
Italy	Turnover	I322,2	I563,7
	Export	893,0	I066,2
	Import	429,2	497,5
Liechtenstein	Turnover	4,4	3,5
	Export	I,9	I,2
	Import	2,5	2,3
Luxembourg	Turnover	I5,0	4,9
	Export	I,3	I,8
	Import	I3,7	3,I
Netherlands	Turnover	744,5	764,6
	Export	566,6	430,3
	Import	I77,9	334,3
Norway	Turnover	65,9	85,3
	Export	27,0	27,6
	Import	38,9	57,7
Poland	Turnover	4022,6	4II2,5
	Export	2083,8	2458,7
	Import	I938,8	I653,8

Portugal	Turnover	57,I	79,6
	Export	43,2	62,I
	Import	I3,9	I7,5
Romania	Turnover	I382,8	I525,7
	Export	680,I	7I0,6
	Import	702,7	8I5,I
Federal Republic of Germany	Turnover	2567,0	2674,9
	Export	I004,I	II29,0
	Import	I562,9	I545,9
Finland	Turnover	I624,3	24II,4
	Export	930,8	II62,3
	Import	693,5	I249,I
France	Turnover	I867,4	2003,9
	Export	930,I	I08I,7
	Import	937,3	922,2
Czechoslovakia	Turnover	362I,5	4I80,5
	Export	I797,2	2090,4
	Import	I824,3	2090,I
Switzerland	Turnover	377,4	380,2
	Export	I72,6	89,5
	Import	204,8	290,7
Sweden	Turnover	274,2	300,6
	Export	I42,3	93,3
	Import	I3I,9	207,3
Yugoslavia	Turnover	I602,7	2507,7
	Export	942,5	II85,6
	Import	660,2	I322,I
Asia:			
Afghanistan	Turnover	264,4	326,5
	Export	I27,8	I42,8
	Import	I36,6	I83,7
Bangladesh	Turnover	26,0	20,2
	Export	II,2	I0,5
	Import	I4,8	9,7
Burma	Turnover	2,4	28,0
	Export	I,2	8,6
	Import	I,2	I9,4
Vietnam	Turnover	288,3	453,4
	Export	2II,2	389,7
	Import	77,I	63,7
India	Turnover	73I,9	III9,3
	Export	368,8	509,I
	Import	363,I	6I0,2
Indonesia	Turnover	25,9	48,9
	Export	8,4	2I,3
	Import	I7,5	27,6
Jordan	Turnover	4,5	7,2
	Export	4,4	7,2
	Import	0,I	-
Iraq	Turnover	492,3	I8I,4
	Export	3I5,2	I79,2
	Import	I77,I	2,2
Iran	Turnover	2I2,3	3I6,6
	Export	I65,7	96,0
	Import	46,6	220,6
Yemen Arab Republic	Turnover	I8,8	II,9
	Export	I8,8	II,9
	Import	-	-
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	Turnover	36,7	44,2
	Export	35,I	43,0
	Import	I,6	I,2
Cyprus	Turnover	I7,I	I9,5
	Export	9,8	9,7
	Import	7,3	9,8
China	Turnover	I4I,8	82,6
	Export	79,0	38,8
	Import	62,8	43,8
Korean People's Democratic Republic	Turnover	293,8	289,I
	Export	I57,0	I6I,7
	Import	I36,8	I27,4
Laos	Turnover	I9,0	I5,5
	Export	I9,0	I5,5
	Import	0	-
Lebanon	Turnover	9,I	I0,6
	Export	7,6	6,8
	Import	I,5	3,8

Malaysia	Turnover	89,1	154,6
	Export	4,3	7,5
	Import	84,8	147,1
Mongolian People's Republic	Turnover	410,0	494,0
	Export	355,2	426,4
	Import	54,8	67,6
Nepal	Turnover	7,5	10,4
	Export	4,8	10,1
	Import	2,7	0,3
Pakistan	Turnover	89,5	72,9
	Export	64,0	44,2
	Import	25,5	28,7
Saudi Arabia	Turnover	17,4	10,2
	Export	17,4	10,2
	Import	-	-
Singapore	Turnover	44,5	56,9
	Export	4,9	17,7
	Import	39,6	39,2
Syria	Turnover	140,5	237,5
	Export	95,0	140,8
	Import	45,5	96,7
Thailand	Turnover	101,3	223,5
	Export	3,1	4,3
	Import	98,2	219,2
Turkey	Turnover	217,8	212,4
	Export	147,7	147,9
	Import	70,1	64,5
Philippines	Turnover	111,8	138,9
	Export	2,5	0,2
	Import	109,3	138,7
Sri Lanka	Turnover	15,6	13,4
	Export	2,0	2,0
	Import	13,6	11,4
Japan	Turnover	1378,4	1574,7
	Export	471,5	406,5
	Import	906,9	1168,2

Africa:

Algeria	Turnover	58,6	87,9
	Export	32,8	46,3
	Import	25,8	41,6
Angola	Turnover	50,2	42,8
	Export	41,8	41,1
	Import	8,4	1,7
Benin	Turnover	3,2	0,6
	Export	2,9	0,6
	Import	0,3	0
Ivory Coast	Turnover	65,0	68,5
	Export	1,6	0,8
	Import	63,4	67,7
Ghana	Turnover	66,4	22,6
	Export	0,1	0,2
	Import	66,3	22,4
Guinea	Turnover	32,6	50,1
	Export	6,1	13,0
	Import	26,5	37,1
Egypt	Turnover	163,0	218,3
	Export	75,0	100,6
	Import	88,0	117,7
Cameroun	Turnover	5,3	13,0
	Export	3,0	1,4
	Import	2,3	11,6
People's Republic of the Congo	Turnover	9,8	5,9
	Export	7,6	4,3
	Import	2,2	1,6
Libya	Turnover	224,7	305,4
	Export	111,8	125,7
	Import	112,9	179,7
Morocco	Turnover	123,8	121,2
	Export	54,7	29,7
	Import	69,1	91,5
Mozambique	Turnover	7,7	20,1
	Export	6,4	19,2
	Import	1,3	0,9

Nigeria	Turnover	50,0	55,I
	Export	38,8	55,I
	Import	II,2	-
Sudan	Turnover	II,4	I8,0
	Export	3,I	I,2
	Import	8,3	I6,8
Sierra Leone	Turnover	4,0	5,8
	Export	0,8	3,7
	Import	3,2	2,I
Tanzania	Turnover	4,2	8,8
	Export	0,2	I,I
	Import	4,0	7,7
Tunisia	Turnover	I0,3	9,3
	Export	8,8	8,9
	Import	I,5	0,4
Ethiopia	Turnover	66,3	83,3
	Export	50,4	69,0
	Import	I5,9	I4,3

Americas:

Argentina	Turnover	6I0,5	I083,3
	Export	20,4	22,9
	Import	590,I	I060,4
Bolivia	Turnover	22,9	5,9
	Export	2,9	4,3
	Import	20,0	I,6
Brazil	Turnover	I50,4	389,7
	Export	II,9	5,4
	Import	I38,5	384,3
Canada	Turnover	336,0	5I6,9
	Export	I5,I	28,3
	Import	320,9	488,6
Colombia	Turnover	II,6	II,I
	Export	6,4	I,8
	Import	5,2	9,3
Cuba	Turnover	28I5,5	2979,9
	Export	II40,5	I392,7
	Import	I675,0	I587,2
Mexico	Turnover	6,5	7,7
	Export	4,7	2,3
	Import	I,8	5,4
Panama	Turnover	5,9	I4,6
	Export	5,9	I4,6
	Import	0	-
Peru	Turnover	6,5	I7,5
	Export	I,3	5,0
	Import	5,2	I2,5
United States of America	Turnover	850,6	948,7
	Export	86,9	57,I
	Import	763,7	89I,6
Uruguay	Turnover	I3,7	38,9
	Export	0,6	0,8
	Import	I3,I	38,I

Australia and Oceania:

Australia	Turnover	444,2	388,8
	Export	2,9	8,0
	Import	44I,3	380,8
New Zealand	Turnover	II6,6	97,7
	Export	I,2	I,8
	Import	II5,4	95,9

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